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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The appellees (hereinafter referred to as "Welch") concur with the 
appellants' (hereinafter referred to as "Giron") statement of jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the district court err when it granted Welch's motion for 
summary judgment, holding "that there was no duty on the part of a signaling 
driver, such as Welch, to the signaled driver, such as Noorbakhsh, or the 
plaintiff in a fact situation very similar" to the Utah Supreme Court case of 
Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073 (1955)? 
Standard: The facts in the appeal at hand must give rise to a greater 
legal duty on the part of Welch, the signalor driver, than that set forth in 
Devine ; or, those facts must show that Welch failed to conform to the 
standard of conduct required of the signalor driver as set forth in Devine, in 
order for this court to reverse the trial court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While it is true that the northbound traffic had backed up on Highland 
Drive from 3300 South to approximately the 3350 South intersection, there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that "rainy" conditions contributed to the 
traffic backup or impaired anyone's vision. It is disputed whether Panter 
Noorbakhsh (hereinafter referred to as "Noorbakhsh") was signaling to turn 
left at the intersection where 3350 South intersects Highland Drive. (R-73) It 
is also unknown, according to Noorbakhsh, how long she waited for a break in 
the traffic. (R-122) It is undisputed, however, that after Welch in some manner 
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signaled to Noorbakhsh, Noorbakhsh pulled out in front of Welch's vehicle, 
came to a complete stop and looked to see if any cars were coming. (R-125) 
She stated in her deposition, "I stopped in front of this car, the lady who gave 
me the right-of-way. I looked, and I couldn't see any cars coming, and then I 
came out a little bit more . . . ." (R-125) Without question, Noorbakhsh was 
in a position superior to Welch to observe traffic coming from behind and to 
the left of Welch. 
Welch brought the motion for summary judgment, not asserting that 
they "had no duty to use reasonable care in signaling Giron", but rather that 
the Devine case does not create a duty under these circumstances. The trial 
court carefully applied the precedent set by this court and granted Welch's 
motion for summary judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Just as Giron totally relies on this court's decision in Devine v. Cook, 3 
Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073 (1955), in their summary of argument, Welch urges 
this court to apply the Devine case as the controlling precedent for the appeal 
at hand. The Devine court, in a fact situation where the signalor driver would 
have had a greater duty imposed upon him than Welch in the present appeal, 
held as a matter of law that the signalor driver did not commit "any act of 
negligence which caused or contributed to the cause of the accident." Devine 
at 1082. 
The existence of a duty must be determined only by the court. It is a 
matter of law. The trial court did not find facts reserved for jury 
determination, but rather found that the circumstances at hand, based on 
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incontroverted facts, did not create a legal obligation upon Welch.1 When the 
signalor driver is not in a position to determine whether the signalee driver 
can safely proceed or when the signalee driver has a better view of oncoming 
traffic, the trial court should determine that the signalor driver is not liable as 
a matter of law. Both of those situations are present in this appeal. 
Accordingly, the trial court's granting of Welch's motion for summary 
judgment should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: BEFORE NEGLIGENCE QUESTIONS CAN BE SUBMITTED TO A 
JURY, THE TRIAL COURT MUST DETERMINE WHETHER THE 
LAW IMPOSES ANY LEGAL DUTY UPON THE DEFENDANT 
Under the facts in Devine, the Utah Supreme Court determined, as a 
matter of law, that signaling another driver to proceed was not an act of 
negligence. In that case, the lawsuit had been tried to a jury. Apparently, at 
the conclusion of the evidence, the signalor driver moved for a directed 
verdict. That motion was not granted and on appeal, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the trial court committed error in refusing to do so. 
The error committed by the trial court in Devine was that it failed in 
fulfilling its obligation to first determine whether, upon the facts and 
evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that a legal obligation 
would be imposed upon the defendant before allowing a jury to determine 
factual questions. 
This is entirely a question of law, to be determined by 
reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and 
lfrhe findings of facts entered by the trial court are based on uncontested facts also cited by Giron in their brief. 
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precedents which make up the law; and it must be 
determined only by the court. 
W. Prosser & W. Keeton, PROSSER & KEATON on TORTS, §37 (W. Keeton, D. 
Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen 5th ed. 1984). 
A trial court is also charged with the obligation to remove the issue from 
the jury when the actions of the defendant clearly have conformed with the 
standard of conduct set forth by the court and where no reasonable jury could 
reach a contrary conclusion. That determination typically takes the form of 
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment or directed verdict. Id. 
See also, Management Comm. v. Gray stone Pines, Inc., 652 P. 2d 896 (Utah 
1982). The Restatement (Second) of Torts outlined the functions of the court 
in §328 B as follows: 
In an action for negligence the court determines 
(a) whether the evidence as to the facts makes an 
issue upon which the jury may reasonably find the 
existence or non-existence of such facts; 
(b) whether such facts give rise to any legal duty on 
the part of the defendant; 
(c) the standard of conduct required of the 
defendant by his legal duty; 
(d) whether the defendant has conformed to that 
standard, in any case in which the jury may not 
reasonably come to a different conclusion; 
(e) the applicability of any rules of law determining 
whether the defendant's conduct is of legal cause of 
harm to the plaintiff; and 
(f) whether the harm claimed to be suffered by the 
plaintiff is legally compensable. 
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When the trial court was presented with Welch's motion for summary 
judgment, it was required to fulfill its obligations as set forth above and apply 
the only precedent in this jurisdiction to the facts at hand. It is clear from the 
court's conclusions of law and Judge Young's comments at the hearing on 
Welch's motion for summary judgment, that the trial court "closely examinefd] 
the circumstances surrounding the alleged negligent signal and expressly 
reject[ed] a blanket rule that signaling drivers could never be held liable for 
injuries resulting from their actions." 
POINT H: THE FACTS IN THE APPEAL AT HAND IMPOSE LESS 
OF A LEGAL OBLIGATION UPON WELCH THAN THE 
FACTS IN DEVBVE 
All parties agree that the precedent to be followed in the present appeal 
is this court's decision in Devine. Giron has not urged this court to depart 
from its ruling in Devine, overturn that case and accept the reasoning of other 
jurisdictions. Accordingly, if this court is persuaded that the facts in the 
Giron appeal would give rise to a lesser or equal legal duty on the part of 
Welch than the duty set forth in Devine or show that Welch equally 
conformed to the standard of conduct required of a signalor driver as set forth 
in Devine, it must affirm the trial court's judgment. 
On page 9 of Giron's brief, Giron correctly pointed out that Devine 
"stands for the principle" that trial courts should grant motions for summary 
judgment and directed verdict 
. . . when both the signaling and signalee drivers have an 
adequate view of the surrounding dangers, or when the 
signalee driver has a better view. Under such 
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circumstances, as a matter of law it is unreasonable to 
assume tha t the signaling driver was doing anything 
more than yielding the right-of-way, because both drivers 
were undoubtedly aware that the signalee had as good a 
view, or better yet, a superior view of the surrounding 
dangers, and could thus judge the risks accordingly. 
A close examination of the events surrounding and the locations of the 
Giron and Devine accidents clearly shows that the signalor driver in the 
Giron appeal would have less of a legal duty to "protect" the plaintiff than the 
signalor driver in the Devine case. 
A. Intersections. 
The accident in Devine occurred at the intersection of 1500 South in 
Bountiful, Utah, and US Highway 91 . 1500 South, a two-lane street, runs east 
and west and crosses US Highway 9 1 , a four-lane street running north and 
south. The speed limit in that immediate area for northbound traffic was 40 
miles per hour. There were no visual obstructions other than vehicular traffic. 
Devine at 1074. 
The intersection where the Noorbakhsh and Giron vehicles collided is 
off-set somewhat. Highland Drive is a four-lane street running north and 
south intersected by 3350 South Street to the east and 3330 South Street to 
the west. 3350 South Street is a two-lane street running east and west, 
slightly angled to the north. The speed limit in the immediate area for 
northbound traffic was 40 miles per hour. There were no visual obstructions 
other than vehicular traffic. 
B. Signalor Drivers. 
In Devine , the signalor driver was operating a tank truck and pulling a 
four-wheel trailer owned and operated by W. S. Hatch Company, Inc. The tank 
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truck was being closely followed by a tractor transporting a two-wheel semi-
trailer also owned by the Hatch Company. The large trucks and trailers were 
proceeding northbound on US Highway 91 on the inside lane and desired to 
make a left-hand turn onto 1500 South. The trucks could not complete that 
left-hand turn because of the narrowness of 1500 South and the fact that the 
signalee driver was stopped at a stop sign in the right-hand lane of that 
intersection, eastbound on 1500 South. Devineat 1074. 
Both trucks came to a complete stop at the intersection. The first truck 
indicated that he intended to make a left-hand turn and then, in some 
manner, signaled for the signalee driver to proceed into the intersection. The 
signalor driver knew that he was being followed by another large tractor and 
trailer. He knew that the signalee driver's view would be blocked by the two 
large vehicles owned by the Hatch Company. He knew of the plaintiffs vehicle 
because he had recently passed it. Id. His view of northbound traffic was 
limited to the use of his rearview mirrors. The purpose for signaling the 
signalee driver to proceed was to assist the Hatch trucks in making their left-
hand turns. The signalor driver had the right-of-way to make a left-hand turn 
once any southbound traffic had cleared. 
In the instant case, Welch was proceeding northbound in the outside 
lane of Highland Drive in heavy traffic. The traffic had backed up to 
approximately 3350 South from 3300 South. She was driving a Buick Skylark. 
Out of courtesy and in an effort to avoid blocking the intersection in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-109.10 (1988 Replacement), she left space for 
Noorbakhsh, the signalee driver, to enter the intersection. (R-73) Noorbakhsh 
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was westbound on 3350 South and stopped at a stop sign. Welch had the 
right-of-way and was intending on proceeding straight ahead when traffic 
would permit. She gained no advantage in the traffic by yielding her right-of-
way to Noorbakhsh. Welch's view of northbound traffic from behind her and 
to her left was limited to looking over her left shoulder or in her rearview 
mirrors. Finally, it was obvious to Welch that Noorbakhsh was looking for 
oncoming traffic when she pulled forward and came to a complete stop in front 
of Welch's vehicle. 
C. Signalee Drivers. 
The Hatch trucks were higher, longer and wider than Welch's Buick 
Skylark. There can be little doubt that the signalee driver's view of oncoming 
traffic in Devine was impaired to a greater extent than the view Noorbakhsh 
had either when stopped for the stop sign or, more particularly, after she had 
proceeded out into the inside lane of the northbound traffic. It is undisputed 
that Noorbakhsh pulled out into the intersection and in front of Welch to look 
for oncoming traffic and determine for herself whether it was safe to proceed. 
D. Plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs in both cases were northbound in travel lanes adjacent to 
the signalor drivers. Again in the Devine case, the plaintiffs view of traffic 
stopped at the accident intersection would have been more greatly impaired by 
the two large trucks and trailers than the Buick Skylark. Additionally, 
Giron's caution should have been heightened by the fact that she was 
proceeding in heavy traffic and that it was obvious that traffic had built up 
from the stop light at 3300 South and Highland Drive. 
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CONCLUSION 
Giron attempts to cloud the simple and straightforward issue presented 
for determination by this court. Without question, the trial court has the 
obligation of determining whether a legal duty exists under the specific 
factual setting in the case at hand. In this appeal, there is only one appellate 
decision which has precedential value. In comparing the Giron appeal and the 
Devine case, it is clear that Welch would have had less of a legal obligation 
than, or at least the same as, the signalor driver in Devine. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of July, 1991. 
DUNN & DUNNS ^ - ^ 
MARK DALTON DUNN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
230 South 500 East, Suite 460 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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